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In response to the proposal that cognitive phenomena might be best understood
in terms of cognitive theories (Endress, 2013), Frank (2013) outlined an impor-
tant research program, suggesting that Bayesian models should be used as rigorous,
mathematically attractive implementations of psychological theories. This research
program is important and promising. However, I show that it is not followed in
practice. I then turn to Frank’s defense of the assumption that learners prefer more
specific rules (the “size principle”), and show that the results allegedly supporting
this assumption do not provide any support for it. Further, I demonstrate that, in
contrast to Frank’s criticisms, there is no circularity in an account of rule-learning
based on “common-sense psychology”, and that Frank’s other criticisms of this ac-
count are unsupported. I conclude that the research program outlined by Frank is
important and promising, but needs to be followed in practice. Be that as it might,
the rule-learning experiments discussed by Frank are still better explained by simple
psychological mechanisms.
Introduction
Using Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) (hereafter FT)
Bayesian model of rule learning as a case study, I
(Endress, 2013) proposed that such models cannot be
considered ideal-observer models but rather make im-
portant ad-hoc assumptions that determine the model
behavior. Further, I argued that a model based on
simple psychological mechanisms explains the data bet-
ter. Frank (2013) outlined a general strategy for how
Bayesian models could make important contributions
for studying cognition. While promising and important,
I show that Frank’s research program is generally not
followed in practice, and that Frank’s criticisms of my
other points and of the simple psychological model of
rule learning are unsupported by earlier research and,
therefore, unfounded (see Appendix A for specific replies
to Frank’s claims; a critical discussion of the evidence
Frank cites in support of the size principle can be found
in Endress, under review).
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How to use Bayesian models
for studying cognition
Frank proposes that Bayesian models are well suited
for formalizing theories of cognition, by implementing
hypotheses in a framework with attractive mathemati-
cal properties, as “Bayesian inference is ‘optimal’ in the
sense that it leads to the correct posterior distribution.”
In other words, using a Bayesian methodology guaran-
tees that, given a set of assumptions, the predictions of
Bayesian models are indeed those that follow from the
assumptions. This is a useful property, even though non-
Bayesian models make the predictions that follow from
their assumptions as well. Crucially, however, while this
approach is promising and important, I will show below
that it is rarely followed in practice, for two important
reasons.
First, if Bayesian models were really used as sug-
gested by Frank, they would be silent on issues
about whether human information processing is opti-
mal. While Frank argues that Bayesian models are not
used to make such claims of optimality, he also acknowl-
edges that many modelers do make such claims. In fact,
even FT assert that their models reflect the “computa-
tional structure of the task” (Footnote 1); if so, learners
who behave according to normatively correct inferences
based on the computational structure of the task pre-
sumably behave “optimally” as well. Hence, in many
cases, Bayesian models are not used as ideal-observer
models, but rather to draw conclusions that are, accord-
ing to Frank, rarely justified.
The second reason relates to the goal of Bayesian
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models. FT (and many other Bayesian modelers) pro-
pose their models to be higher-level models of the com-
putational structure of the problem that are agnostic
about the underlying mechanisms. However, FT con-
tinuously switch between levels of description, making
it difficult to decide what the model actually describes.
For example, while presenting their model as an ideal-
observer model, FT also hold that infants are batch
learners who remember all familiarization items before
making inferences.1 This requires them to include fur-
ther implementational parameters about memory reli-
ability, and these parameters have a substantial effect
on the model behavior in turn. Hence, by continuously
switching between levels of description, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to decide whether the model behavior
is due to the theory FT set out to test, or rather to one
of the extraneous assumptions.
This is particularly clear in FT’s use of the forgetting
rates in their simulations. For example, for theorists
who, like FT, hold that learners are guided by the size
principle and faithfully remember familiarization items,
it might be important to find out under which conditions
the models account for the data, and, in fact, the mod-
els provide rich information about this issue. In some
simulations, FT need to assume forgetting rates of 10%,
in others of 40%, in others of 60% and in still others
of 80%, and the models often do not fit the data unless
such specific forgetting rates are assumed. If, as Frank
suggests, “investigating the dependence of predictions
on assumptions about perceptual and memory noise is
precisely the purpose of ideal observers,”a plausible con-
clusion from the models’ fatal dependence on very spe-
cific and mutually inconsistent parameter values is that
the models do not in fact provide adequate accounts of
the experimental data.
Is there evidence that learners
prefer more specific rules?
One of the crucial assumptions of FT’s models, and
one of the crucial arguments of Frank’s reply, is that
learners preferentially learn more specific rules (the“size
principle”). As I pointed out, the size principle has
sound justifications in the case of language acquisition
(e.g., Hyams, 1986; Manzini &Wexler, 1987), but its use
by FT is particularly implausible. Specifically, in FT’s
model, infants might encounter a total of three syllables.
Before encountering any syllable triplet, infants know
that the three syllables allow for a total 27 triplets, that
6 of these triplets follow an ABB pattern (e.g., pu-li-li),
that 3 of these triplets follow an AAA pattern (where
all three syllables are identical), as well as the number
of triplets that would conform to any conceivable rule.
Unless infants have innate knowledge of the number of
items compatible with any conceivable rule and any con-
ceivable number of syllables, FT’s models suggest that
infants have to process about 900 hypothetical and coun-
terfactual triplets per second. This assumption lies at
the core of FT’s model. Hence, if it is unsupported, the
model become unsupported as well.2
While Frank claims that several papers support the
size principle, most of the data presented in these papers
is unrelated to the size principle, confounded by other
factors, can be fit by more plausible models that make
no use of the size principle, or is inconsistent with the
models it is allegedly predicted by. A critical discus-
sion of these papers can be found elsewhere (Endress,
under review). Further, even if these results supported
some version of the size principle, they would not sup-
port FT’s models, because participants could estimate
the size of classes based on stimuli they actually saw,
and not on hundreds of thousands of hypothetical and
counterfactual stimuli they never experienced.
Given the absence of evidence for the size princi-
ple as used by FT, I ran an experiment illustrating
the fact that the size principle cannot be taken for
granted. Participants were presented with a sequence of
syllable triplets conforming to a repetition-pattern (e.g.,
wo-fe-fe). Following this, they had to choose between
triplets of rhesus monkey vocalizations conforming to
the pattern, and triplets of human syllables violating
the pattern. As a result, they could choose between
the more specific repetition-pattern, and the less spe-
cific “all items are made of syllables” regularity. Im-
portantly, FT’s incorporated both types of rules; hence,
this experiment compared the predictions of FT’s model
to the behavior of actual participants. However, results
showed that most participants chose the less specific“all
1 Indeed, FT “distinguished the larger memory demands
involved in maintaining a representation of training items
across a long exposure period compared with an individual
evaluating test items in the moment”. However, if the mem-
ory demands are different in different parts of the experi-
ment, memory is necessarily used in the process of the gen-
eralizations. As a result, infants must be batch learners who
remember all familiarization items (more or less faithfully
according to the memory parameter).
2 While FT acknowledged the psychological implausibility
of such a model, Frank argues that enumerating all possible
triplets is not implausible after all, because “research on nu-
merical cognition suggests that adults and infants need not
enumerate to make quick and accurate judgments about the
cardinality of sets (Xu, 2002; Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman,
1999).” However, participants in number cognition experi-
ments have to process maybe up to 100 dots on a screen, but
usually much fewer, and certainly not hundreds of thousands
of items as in FT’s simulations. Further, and crucially, ob-
servers in numerical cognition tasks see the objects they have
to enumerate; in contrast, in FT’s simulations, the triplets to
be enumerated are hypothetical and counterfactual. It seems
fair to assume that observer cannot estimate the number of
dots on displays they are never shown. Likewise, there is no
evidence that participants can“count” the number of triplets
they never hear. As a result, the number processing litera-
ture provides no support for FT’s models.
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items are made of syllables” regularity.
Frank dismisses these data, arguing that they “do
not provide evidence against the size principle.” How-
ever, this was not the point of the experiments. Rather,
I argued that they “fail to support the predictions of
Frank and Tenenbaum’s (2011) model and demonstrate
that a preference for more specific patterns cannot be
taken for granted,” and that the size principle can be
easily overwritten by other stimulus properties. Hence,
Frank’s claims notwithstanding, there is no evidence for
the central assumption of FT’s models, which, therefore,
remains speculative and psychologically implausible.
Common sense psychology
does account for the data
An alternative approach to rule-learning can be based
on perceptual or memory primitives (Endress, Scholl, &
Mehler, 2005; Endress, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Mehler,
2007; Endress, Nespor, & Mehler, 2009). Frank criti-
cizes this account for being circular, because it does not
specify which patterns learners might pick up. He gives
the example that, when presented with syllable triplets
conforming to a repetition-pattern, participants might
well learn generalizations “like ‘any string that ends in
/di/, /je/, /li/, or /we/’ or ‘any string with three or four
elements.’ ”
However, the circularity results from a confusion be-
tween the patterns that are learned, and those that are
tested. In fact, to the extent that infants can detect the
number of sounds (or properties with which the number
of sounds might be confounded; see Starkey, Spelke, &
Gelman, 1983, 1990, but see Lipton & Spelke, 2004),
they will do so also in rule-learning experiments. Like-
wise, Gerken’s (2010) data clearly show that infants can
learn a regularity of the sort “any string that ends in
/di/”, and adults can, at least after many more famil-
iarization examples, learn regularities of the sort “any
string that ends in /di/, /je/, /li/, or /we/” as well
(Endress & Mehler, 2009). However, such abilities were
simply not tested in these experiments.
In fact, the psychological account does not need to
make arbitrary assumptions. The question of which hy-
potheses infants can and do entertain is simply an em-
pirical one. Likewise, infants’ behavior will plausibly be
mostly driven by the most salient patterns; the relative
saliency of different pattern is an empirical question, and
can be tested by pitting patterns against each other (see
Gervain & Endress, in preparation). Of course, such an
approach does not answer the question of why infants
entertain some hypotheses, or why some patterns are
more salient than others. However, while FT propose
an answer to such questions, their explanation either
makes incorrect predictions, or does not account for the
data to be explained in the first place.
Conclusions
Frank proposes an important step forward in the use
of Bayesian models to study cognition, namely to use
them to refine hypotheses and make testable predictions.
If this were how Bayesian models are used in practice,
Franks proposal could become an important tool for de-
veloping psychological theories of psychological phenom-
ena and to ground them in empirical research.
Appendix A
Responses to specific responses
In his Appendix A, Frank comments on some of my
more specific criticisms of FT’s models. I will briefly
comment on his responses in turn. As pointed out by
Frank, many of the criticism were related to the lack of
evidence for the size principle, and the associated im-
plausibility of the model. As discussed above, there still
is no such evidence.
Regarding Endress et al.’s (2007) data, FT repro-
duced the performance difference between repetition-
patterns and “ordinal” patterns, arguing that it might
be due to the fact that, in the case of the ordinal pat-
terns, “a number of possible rules were consistent with
the training stimuli” (p. 365). If so, one would expect
the same difficulties with simple rising or falling con-
tours such as“lowest-middle-highest.” I showed that this
is not the case, and that most participants are at ceil-
ing learning rising or falling contours. However, Frank’s
new simulations show that raising and falling contours
are learned better than ordinal patterns. Still, further
simulations revealed that, if, as in FT, one treats the
relative surprisal for incorrect vs. correct test item as a
measure of performance on the test items and uses FT’s
model parameters, the model predicts that performance
for repetition-patterns should be about 20% better than
for rising or falling contours for the number of tones
used by Endress et al. (2007), and can be made arbitrar-
ily large simply by changing the number of tones from
which the triplets are constructed.3 Given that most
participants were at ceiling with the rising and falling
contours, the data contradict this prediction. Hence,
the conclusion is inevitable that FT’s models reproduced
Endress et al.’s (2007) results due to assumptions that
are empirically incorrect.
Regarding Gerken’s (2010) data, Frank acknowledges
that the model’s ability to learn from a few examples
results in the prediction that humans should unlearn
a rule from a single counter-example, even after thou-
sands of positive examples. While Frank argues that
this is a short-coming of the models that can be fixed,
3 For example, with 18 tones, participants should perform
about 42% better on the repetition patterns than on the ris-
ing and falling contours. This model behavior is expected,
as it is easy to calculate that the rising/falling regularity is
less specific than the repetition pattern for 9 tones or more.
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this “short-coming” is actually the reason for which the
model accounted for the data in the first place.
Regarding Go´mez’s (2002) results, Frank acknowl-
edges that the model fails to account for the data,
but argues that this can be addressed in further work.
However, given that, according to Frank, this revolves
around the interpretation of one of their parameters, it
is unclear why FT introduced a parameter with no clear
interpretation in the first place.
Regarding Kova´cs and Mehler’s (2009a) data, Frank
argues that ideal-observer are not opposed to process
models, even though FT’s ideal observer model makes
no contact whatsoever with well-established process-
based explanation. Specifically, Kova´cs and Mehler
(2009b) showed that bilingual infants can learn multiple
regularities while monolinguals can learn only one, an
ability that has been linked to the better developed ex-
ecutive function in bilinguals. FT modified their model
to be more likely to admit more than one regularity,
found that it was indeed more likely to learn more than
one regularity, and conclude that bilinguals are some-
how designed to be more likely to admit more than one
regularity as well. Further, they postulate that bilingual
advantages in tasks such as the Stroop task are a conse-
quence of being more likely to learn multiple regularities
as well, with no supporting evidence whatsoever, despite
the prima facie implausibility of this claim.
Appendix B
References
Endress, A. D.(2013). Bayesian learning and the psychology
of rule induction. Cognition, 127 (2), 159–176.
Endress, A. D.(under review). Is there evidence for the size
principle? a critical review.
Endress, A. D., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., & Mehler, J.(2007).
Perceptual constraints and the learnability of simple
grammars. Cognition, 105 (3), 577–614.
Endress, A. D., & Mehler, J.(2009). Primitive computations
in speech processing. The Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 62 (11), 2187–2209.
Endress, A. D., Nespor, M., & Mehler, J.(2009). Perceptual
and memory constraints on language acquisition. Trends
in Cognitive Sciences, 13 (8), 348–353.
Endress, A. D., Scholl, B. J., & Mehler, J. (2005). The role
of salience in the extraction of algebraic rules. Journal of
Experimental Psychology. General, 134 (3), 406-19.
Frank, M. C. (2013). Throwing out the bayesian baby with
the optimal bathwater: Response to. Cognition, 128 (3),
417–423.
Frank, M. C., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2011). Three ideal ob-
server models for rule learning in simple languages. Cog-
nition, 120 (3), 360–371.
Gerken, L. (2010). Infants use rational decision criteria for
choosing among models of their input. Cognition, 115 (2),
362-6.
Go´mez, R. L. (2002). Variability and detection of invariant
structure. Psychological Science, 13 (5), 431-6.
Hyams, N. (1986). Language acquisition and the theory of
parameters. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kova´cs, A. M., & Mehler, J. (2009a). Cognitive gains in 7-
month-old bilingual infants. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
106 (16), 6556–6560.
Kova´cs, A. M., & Mehler, J. (2009b). Flexible learning of
multiple speech structures in bilingual infants. Science,
325 (5940), 611–612.
Lipton, J. S., & Spelke, E. S.(2004). Discrimination of large
and small numerosities by human infants. Infancy, 5 (3),
271–290.
Manzini, M. R., & Wexler, K. (1987). Parameters, binding
theory, and learnability. Linguistic Inquiry, 18 (3), pp.
413-444.
Starkey, P., Spelke, E., & Gelman, R. (1983). Detection of
intermodal numerical correspondences by human infants.
Science, 222 (4620), 179-81.
Starkey, P., Spelke, E., & Gelman, R. (1990). Numerical
abstraction by human infants. Cognition, 36 (2), 97-127.
Whalen, J., Gallistel, C., & Gelman, R. (1999). Nonverbal
counting in humans: The psychophysics of number repre-
sentation. Psychological Science, 10 (2), 130-137.
Xu, F.(2002). The role of language in acquiring object kind
concepts in infancy. Cognition, 85 (3), 223–250.
